Political Deepfakes Are As Credible As Other Fake Media And (Sometimes) Real Media

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soubhikbarari.github.io/files/deepfakes.pdf

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

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

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

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

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- So are these concerns warranted?

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2. Detection task: discern deepfakes from authentic clips $\rightsquigarrow$ randomize number of deepfakes in task environment

Who is Susceptible? (RQ2)

	Subgroup	Mechanisms of Credibility (though we don't test these)
Non-Intervenable in Survey	Partisans (w/out-partisan targets)	• Directional motivated reasoning • Accuracy motivated reasoning
	Sexists (w/female targets)	• Consistency w/prior hostile beliefs • Consistency w/prior benevolent beliefs
	Older adults	Inability to evaluate accuracy of digital info
	Low cognitive reflection	Overreliance on intuition in judgment
	Low political knowledge	• Inability to evaluate plausibility of political events • Inability to recognize real facial features of target
	Low digital literacy	• Inability to evaluate accuracy of digital info • Limited recognition of deepfake technology
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If popular concerns true, these "at-risk" subgroups might find deepfakes *more* credible than audio, text, etc.

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② Detection Task	Random video feed: • **No-fake**: 8 authentic • **Low-fake**: 6 authentic, 2 deepfakes • **High-fake**: 2 authentic, 6 deepfakes	• Debrief deepfakes in ① • Acc prime	• Acc • FPR • FNR

Pre-Exposure Demographic Questionnaire

- Gender
- Ambivalent sexism
- PID
- Political knowledge


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
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
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• Rate how warmly you feel (1-100) towards each candidate: Biden / Klobuchar / Warren / Sanders
• Digital literacy

Example video exposure:



Watch Video

Example audio exposure:



Example text exposure:

Leak: Elizabeth Warren calls Donald Trump "a piece of s—" in 2019 campaign call

In call with a campaign contributor, Warren was recorded calling President Donald Trump "a piece of sh**" and a pedophile.

Comments

Reference affective exposure (skit):

Reference affective exposure (ad):

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
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
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
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Detection Task
No-fake Newsfeed
Low-fake Newsfeed
High-fake Newsfeed
Concurrent Detection Questionnaire
• Is this clip fake/doctored?
• How confident (1-5) are you that [event in each clip] actually occurred?

Example detection clips:

(a) Is this clipping fake/doctored?

(b) Is this clipping fake/doctored?

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  $\rightsquigarrow$ no, *but*, if deepfakes are now indistinguishable from real videos, our findings hint that's still a problem

Findings

RQ1/2:

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



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

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

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

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

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

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

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



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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- Partisan cheerleading? Motivated reasoning? All mechanisms to explore in future work.

  "If everybody lies to you, the consequence is not that you believe the lies, but rather that nobody believes anything any longer" – Hannah Arendt