

# **Partisan Cues from Corporate America: Sparse, Increasingly Liberal, and Aligned with (Some) Audiences**

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DIAGEO

Johnson & Johnson  
WALMART



Coca-Cola

PARMA

Pfizer

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
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- ▶ If true  $\rightsquigarrow$  big problem for democratic accountability.

# Inconsistency Between Speech and Activities



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
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\*Chevron-affiliated PACs donated 2x in campaign contributions to Republicans from 2012-2022

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- 4 These cues *largely do not align* with consumer demographic profiles (e.g. liberal  $\neq$  younger customer segment)

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Explicit partisan cues through *position-taking*:

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We call for the peaceful transition of the U.S. government. The violence in Washington, D.C. tarnishes a two-century tradition of respect for the rule of law. We look forward to engaging with President-Elect Biden and his administration to move the nation forward.

9:17 PM · Jan 6, 2021 · Twitter Web App



**646** Retweets   **3,114** Quote Tweets   **2,691** Likes



# How Corporate Brands Use Partisan Cues in Public Relations

Explicit partisan cues through *position-taking*:

## *Hundreds of Companies Unite to Oppose Voting Limits, but Others Abstain*

Amazon, Google, G.M. and Starbucks were among those joining the biggest show of solidarity by businesses over legislation in numerous states.



From left, Kenneth Frazier, the chief executive of Merck; Kenneth Chenault, a former chief of American Express; Mary T. Barra, who runs General Motors; and Kevin Johnson, who runs Starbucks. Jason Redmond/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images



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
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


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
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
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


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


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


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
..but not universally (e.g. observances, places):







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

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
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


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
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